

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLenary CONVERSATIONS, JUNE 21, 1977 (SALT
TWO-1245).

1. (ROWNY-BELETSKY, A-1598)

A. SS-16/SS-20 ISSUE

BELETSKY WENT IMMEDIATELY TO THE DEFENSE OF SEMENOV'S PLENARY
STATEMENT ON THE SS-20 LAUNCHER ISSUE. HE REPEATED MANY OF
SEMENOV'S POINTS, SAYING IT WAS THE FIRM POSITION OF THE SOVIETS
NOT TO COUNT LAUNCHERS FOR MRBMS IN THE 2,400 AGGREGATE. HE
USED SUCH WORDS AS "ARTIVICIAL," "CONTRIVED," AND "ATTEMPTS TO
GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE."

BELETSKY SAID THAT THE SSA-20 HAD BEEN DESIGNATED AS AN
MRBM AND THAT THEREFORE LAUNCHERS FOR MRBMS COULD NOT COUNT IN
THE AGGREGATE. ROWNY SAID SINCE US WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE
SS-20 LAUNCHER DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF LAUNCHING AN ICBM,
WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO COUNT IT IN THE AGGREGATE UNLESS THERE
WERE VERIFIABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ASSURE US THAT LAUNCHERS
OF A TYPE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SS-20 CANNOT BE USED TO LAUNCH

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SS-16 ICBMS.

B. DESIGNATION OF MISSILES

IN TOUCHING BRIEFLY ON THE MIRV VERIFICATION, ROWNY REFERRED
TO THE RS-18. SUDONKIN, IN AN ASIDE, ASKED ROWNY NOT TO USE
THE "CONFUSING NEW DESIGNATORS" GIVEN TO US BY SOVIETS. HE SAID

THAT THE NEW SOVIET DESIGNATORS WERE ARBITRARY, ARRIVED AT BY ADDING TO OR SUBTRACTING FROM DESIGNATORS USE BY THE US. HE ADDED WITH A SMILE THAT THESE SOVIET DESIGNATORS HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO CONFUSE THE US.

2. (JOHNSON-SHCHUKIN, A-1604)

A. MIRV VERIFICATION

IN DISCUSSING EARLE'S STATEMENT, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT "IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE QUESTIONS BROUGHT UP BY AMBASSADOR EARLE HAVE ALL BEEN RESOLVED, AND THAT ONLY THE APPROPRIATE WORDING REMAINS TO BE FOUND." JOHNSON COMMENTED THAT "NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIET FORMULATION THAT IS TROUBLESOME TO US. THE US SIDE IS CONCERNED THAT THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE SOVIET ASSOCIATION OF A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH A MIRVED MISSILE AND ITS LAUNCHER." IN RESPONSE SHCHUKIN DESCRIBED THE SOVIET PROCEDURE BY SAYING, "THERE IS A TYPE OF LAUNCHER AND A TYPE OF MISSILE. THEN THERE IS A TEST OF A GIVEN LAUNCHER USING A GIVEN MISSILE. IF AFTER THAT, THAT LAUNCHER IS DEPLOYED IT IS IDENTIFIED AS A LAUNCHER OF A MIRVED MISSILE AND IS COUNTED." JOHNSON ASKED, "HOW DO YOU ASSOCIATE A MISSILE WITH A LAUNCHER?" SHCHUKIN SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE TESTING OF THE MISSILE WITH MIRVS FROM A LAUNCHER IS WHAT CHARACTERIZES THE LAUNCHER. HE MEANT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ACTUALLY LAUNCH THE MISSILE FROM THAT LAUNCHER.

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SHCHUKIN THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF WHY THE US ASSOCIATED SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE WORD "CONTAINED." HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE US SIDE BUT CONFESSED HE STILL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT. HE SAID THE FACT THAT A LAUNCHER MIGHT CONTAIN A MISSILE WOULD NOT MEAN THAT IT COULD BE USED FOR LAUNCHING THAT MISSILE. THEORETICALLY, HE SAID, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PUT A MINUTEMAN III MISSILE IN A MINUTEMAN II LAUNCHER JUST FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GEOMETRICAL COMPATIBILITY. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THIS WAS DONE FOR ANY REASON, IT WOULD NOT IMPLY THAT THAT LAUNCHER COULD, IN FACT, BE USED TO FIRE A MINUTEMAN III. THE WORD "CONTAINED" IN SHCHUKIN'S VIEW IS SUPERFLUOUS, AND IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER TO SAY "HAS BEEN USED FOR LAUNCHING DURING TESTING." SHCHUKIN ADDED THAT, "THEN WHEN THAT LAUNCHER IS LOCATED ELSEWHERE, IT WOULD BE KNOWN AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THAT MIRVED MISSILE WITHOUT THE NEED FOR IT TO ACTUALLY LAUNCH A MIRVED MISSILE AT THE NEW LOCATION." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, "IN THIS CASE, I DON'T THINK WE HAVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO THE EVENT ITSELF. ALL WE NEED NOW IS TO EXPRESS IT PROPERLY IN RUSSIAN AND IN ENGLISH." HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN SAYING ALL OF THIS BECAUSE HE FELT THE USE OF THE TERM "CONTAINED" COULD LEAD

TO PROLONGED, USELESS DISCUSSIONS. HE FELT THAT DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING IS SUFFICIENT.

B. BOMBER VARIANTS

SHCHUKIN SAID THAT WE SHOULD DECIDE THE PROBLEM OF AIRCRAFT. HE STILL MAINTAINED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS BEING UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATED BY THE US SIDE BECAUSE OF THEIR BELIEF THAT TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ASW AIRCRAFT COULD BE CONVERTED INTO BOMBERS. HE WAS VERY EMPHATIC, AND SAID, "I STILL MAINTAIN THIS IS A TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING IMPOSSIBILITY. LET ME EXPLAIN. WHEN AN AIRCRAFT IS DESIGNED AS A TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE OR AN ASW AIRCRAFT, AND IS EQUIPPED WITH SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATE TO ITS MISSION, TO TAKE IT ALL OUT WOULD SO ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECRET

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AIRCRAFT THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED AS A HEAVY BOMBER. THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE FOR A PASSENGER AIRCRAFT." JOHNSON RECALLED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSION WITH SHCHUKIN THAT IN SOVIET PRACTICE A BOMBER WAS DESIGNED AS THE BASIC AIRFRAME AND THAT VARIANTS FOR OTHER PURPOSES WERE PROVIDED AT LATER STAGES IN MANUFACTURE; AND, IN THE CASE OF TANKERS PARTICULARLY, SINCE THEY WERE ALREADY EQUIPPED WITH BOMB BAYS, THE CONVERSION WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT. JOHNSON NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 14 STATED THAT ALL VARIANTS REALLY WERE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT BUILT FROM THE GROUND UP, AND THAT THE CONVERSIONS IN THAT CASE WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. TO THIS SHCHUKIN SIMPLY CONCURRED WITH SEMENOV. HE SAID THAT THE MYASISHCHEV AIRCRAFT WAS DEVELOPED SPECIFICALLY AS A TANKER AND TO CHANGE THE INTERIOR EQUIPMENT TO CONVERT IT TO A BOMBER IS A VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY. EARLE

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